There are 2 new disads on reverse overstretch and redeployment that are tailored to the affs and turns case. Independent impacts are mostly heg, so I stayed away from that, and I suggest you do too, unless you want to make it easier for the aff


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BQ’s Iraq Colonialism Neg DDI 2010

1

Iraq Colonialism Neg Part Two

Iraq Colonialism Neg Part Two 1

Strat Sheet 2

T – Reduction 3

T – Discourse Ain’t Topical, Yo 4

T – Embassies Not Military/Police Presence 5

1. Extra topical – the aff can claim completely unpredictable advantages that the neg can’t research effectively, kills strategy, fairness, and education 5

Morality Turns 6

Morality Turns 7

Morality Turns 8

Morality Turns 9

Morality Turns 10

Morality Turns 11

Morality Turns 13

Morality Turns 14

Morality Turns 15

Morality Turn 16

AT: Iraq is the Linchpin 17

AT: Iraq is the Linchpin 18

AT: Iraq is the Linchpin 19

AT: Iraq is the Linchpin 20

AT: Iraq is the Linchpin 21

AT: SOFA Makes Your Disads Inevitable 22

AT: SOFA Makes Your Disads Inevitable 23

Framework 24

AT: Mindset Change 25

AT: 1.3 Million Dead 26

Redeployment 1NC 27

Redeployment – AT: Mindset Shift 29

Redeployment -- AT: Iraq is Unique 30

Redeployment – AT: No Impact to COIN 31

Redeployment -- AT: Decision Rule 32

2. Their Shaikh D-rule evidence isn’t about Iraq, but historical colonialism – if we demonstrate the plan increases colonialism, vote neg 32

Overstretch 1NC 33

Overstretch DA– Link Ext. 34

Condition CP Ext. 35

PMC DA – AT: Impact Inevitable 36


Strat Sheet
In here you’ll find a lot more work responsive to 2AC spin on disads – the big picture is that the aff is going to contradict themselves into falling into your lair of utilitarianism and turns. Remember to scrutinize the 2AC evidence on disads for links to security logic that they criticize, like if they say that Afghanistan is already a failed state so we should give up, or that the impact is inevitable. This contradicts the 1AC framework and lets you get your disads! They also want to claim that discourse is key to solve their advantages, this is abusive and you must call them on it!
There are 2 new disads on reverse overstretch and redeployment that are tailored to the affs and turns case. Independent impacts are mostly heg, so I stayed away from that, and I suggest you do too, unless you want to make it easier for the aff.
There are a bunch of turns to their morality claims that say withdrawing prematurely from Iraq is unethical, read these!!
Finally, there’s a page that says “T – Embassies aren’t military/police presence” –the RT aff especially claims that they get solvency from removing embassies -- know that embassies in Iraq are part of Iraq’s territory, but embassies aren’t military, and that’s extra T. The other T violation says that T must be different from the SOFA agreement in the status quo, which helps you get your disad links.
Please ask me questions if you want 

Laura

T – Reduction



A. Interpretation - a reduction must be a quantifiable decrease of at least 25% from the President’s Funding baseline.

DOD 5/12/2003, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction SUBJECT: Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, N UMBER 5000.2 cp
E9.4.3.  Additional Funding Considerations.  The DoD Components shall not terminate or substantially reduce participation in international cooperative ACAT ID programs under signed international agreements without USD(AT&L) approval; or in international cooperative ACAT IAM programs without ASD(C3I) approval.  A DoD Component may not terminate or substantially reduce U.S. participation in an international cooperative program until after providing notification to the USD(AT&L) or the ASD(C3I).  As a result of that notification, the USD(AT&L) or the ASD(C3I) may require the DoD Component to continue to provide some or all of the funding for that program in order to minimize the impact on the international cooperative program.  Substantial reduction is defined as a funding or quantity decrease of 25 percent or more in the total funding or quantities in the latest President's Budget for that portion of the international cooperative program funded by the DoD Component seeking the termination or reduced participation.
B. The plan only guarantees that the status quo will continue – it does not specify a reduction from the funding baseline.
C. Voting issue:

1. Ground. No unique disads or links – even if there are reason’s the plans bad, they’re already occurring because the plan is already occurring so we can’t garner offense.
2. Education. Kills policymaking education – the point is to learn how to craft new policy changes to fix status quo problems, rather than just researching why existing governmental policies are good.
3. Mixes Burdens. The plan text doesn't add a decrease from a baseline – we'd have to research the case to know whether it's topical in the first place – it's unfair to make us beat their inherency to prove they're not topical.

T – Discourse Ain’t Topical, Yo
A. Interpretation – the aff must claim advantages off of the direct result of United States federal government action
B. Violation – the aff claims solvency from the discursive nature of debating the plan during the round
C. Extra topicality is a voting issue:

1. education – restricting plans to literature grounded in government action increases meaningful and warranted clash, not assertions about the results of our discussion

2. predictable limits – the negative can never do research about the hundreds of potential discursive implications of the plan

3. utopian fiat – the aff fiats that the discussion here will spread and reach other people to break down imperialism, this is an independent reason to vote negative for fairness, and means they can never solve their advantages
T – Embassies Not Military/Police Presence
A. Interpretation -- Presence refers to military forces deployed for the purpose of influence, reassurance, deterrence, and initial crisis response

Flournoy, 1 - senior advisor for international security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and previously served as a distinguished research professor in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction (Michele, QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, Ed: Michele Flournoy http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA430963&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Italics in original
Terms such as presence and engagement are often used rather loosely. Following a survey and

analysis of existing sources, we developed or adopted specific definitions for the terms used to describe

these strategy issues.We define overseas presence as military forces permanently stationed or rotationally

or intermittently deployed overseas for the purposes of influence, engagement, reassurance, deterrence,

and initial crisis response. We define peacetime military engagement as encompassing all U.S.

military activities designed to enhance constructive security relations and promote broad U.S. security

interests, including activities such as combined training and education, military-to-military interactions,

security assistance, and various other programs. U.S. overseas presence forces are often also involved

in conducting peacetime military engagement activities.
B. Violation – The aff claims solvency off of the removal of US embassies from Iraq – which are diplomatic missions, not military forces
C. Vote neg

1. Extra topical – the aff can claim completely unpredictable advantages that the neg can’t research effectively, kills strategy, fairness, and education

Morality Turns
The US’s responsibility for the crisis in Iraq means it must fulfill its moral duty to support the nation – withdrawal would be unethical and disastrous.
Gerard F. Powers, director of policy studies at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, former director of the Office of International Justice and Peace of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2/18/08, http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=10618
If it was immoral to intervene in Iraq in the first place, is it immoral to stay? Even Hillary Clinton, who supported the intervention, has claimed that Barack Obama is inconsistent because he opposed the intervention but later supported funding for U.S. troops to remain. Clearly, the ethics of intervention and the ethics of exit are related. The widespread, and correct, belief that the original intervention was illegitimate, the lack of broad international support and the failure to tie the toppling of a brutal regime in Iraq to a realistic and clear post-intervention plan have contributed to the debacle there. That said, as Bishop William Skylstad, then president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, emphasized in November, the focus now should be “more on the ethics of exit than on the ethics of intervention,” for the two, while related, are distinct. A just war can lead to an unjust peace; less often, an unjust war can lead to a just peace. Today’s challenge in Iraq is to ensure that an unjust war does not lead to an unjust peace.

Many in the antiwar camp fail to acknowledge that the United States bears a moral burden to help Iraqis build a just peace, a burden made heavier precisely because the war is unjust. As an uninvited occupying power, the United States has assumed a whole set of moral obligations to promote the common good of the Iraqi people until Iraqis can take control of their own affairs.

Legally, the United States is no longer occupying Iraq, but by almost any measure Iraq is a failed state. Morally, therefore, the United States retains significant residual responsibilities to Iraqis. The Iraq intervention may have been an optional, immoral war; but given the U.S. government’s shared responsibility for the ensuing crisis, its continued engagement is not an optional moral commitment.

Others calling for U.S. withdrawal acknowledge the ethics of exit, but give too much weight to an ethic of efficacy (Is U.S. intervention working?) over an ethic of responsibility (What do we owe Iraqis?).

Efficacy must be part of any moral analysis of Iraq. At a forum sponsored by Fordham’s Center on Religion and Culture and Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute, the ethicist Michael Walzer, a vocal opponent of the Iraq intervention, argued that “we are consequentialists for the moment. Neither staying on nor leaving Iraq is a categorical imperative” (seehttp://kroc.nd.edu/events/07fordhamevent.shtml).

Unlike many in the debate, Walzer is clear about the breadth of moral obligations that exist in Iraq and thus the range of consequences that matter morally. According to Walzer, “We have to figure out a strategy that produces the least bad results for the Iraqi people, for other people in the Middle East, and for American soldiers.”

Arguments for withdrawal tend to give most weight to what is good for U.S. soldiers (and, I would add, U.S. interests). It would be morally irresponsible not to take into account legitimate U.S. interests, not least our moral obligations to the small percentage of Americans who are helping to shoulder the burden in Iraq, and the moral costs of spending more than $2 billion per week on the war while other pressing needs go unmet.

Moral clarity about what we owe ourselves is often not matched by moral clarity about what we owe Iraqis. The Catholic Democrats and presidential candidates who rally antiwar support by equating a withdrawal of U.S. troops with “ending the war” in Iraq define the “ought” mostly without reference to the Iraqi people. Proposals to de-authorize and stop funding the war and to set strict timetables for redeployment might “end the war” for Americans. But would they end the war between Sunnis and Shiites? Would they end the insurgency, the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks or the widespread criminality in Iraq?

The moral question, then, is not the one put by Senator John Warner to Gen. David Petraeus: What policies and strategies will best serve U.S. national security interests? Rather, it is: What policies and strategies will best serve the interests and well-being of the Iraqi people?

When U.S. obligations to Iraqis are taken into account, they are often defined in a minimalist way, such as: combatting terrorist groups in Iraq; training and equipping Iraqi security forces; providing reconstruction assistance; pressing Iraqis to meet benchmarks for political “reconciliation”; taking in more Iraqi refugees, including those who have supported U.S. efforts; protecting the Kurds; and deterring Iranian aggression or regional instability. These are legitimate goals, but they do not seem commensurate with the magnitude of the needs of the Iraqi people, especially for security.

Despite the fact that ensuring order is the primary responsibility of an occupying power, the Bush administration did not make protecting Iraqi civilians a priority until the “surge.” The leading Democratic presidential candidates are clear that protecting civilians is not a U.S. obligation, despite abundant evidence that Iraqi security forces cannot do it alone. The

Morality Turns
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inadequacy of such minimalist goals is clearer when tied to early deadlines for withdrawal. Senator Carl Levin, the

chairman of the Armed Services Committee, argues that such deadlines would force Iraqis “to look into the abyss” of a civil

war. Would proponents of this high stakes game of chicken be so confident of its efficacy or be so willing to impose the burden of moral risk on a long-victimized Iraqi people if their calculations began with a more robust understanding of U.S. ethical responsibilities to Iraqis?

Despite the obvious difficulties involved, the original U.S. objectives of building an Iraq that is “peaceful, united, stable, democratic and secure” are closer to what the United States owes Iraqis than are the minimalist alternatives. I would state the U.S. responsibilities more robustly than the Democratic presidential candidates have outlined or the Bush administration has pursued in practice. There are four: (1) not to end all political violence, but to ensure that an Iraqi government can maintain a reasonable degree of security for the whole country and minimize the threat of chaos or civil war; (2) not to impose a Western-style democracy, but to facilitate establishment of a stable, fairly representative government that respects basic human rights, especially minority rights; (3) not to promote a U.S.-style capitalist economy, but to restore Iraq’s infrastructure and a viable economy that serves Iraqi needs, not U.S. interests, especially not U.S. oil interests; and (4) not to stay without the consent of a legitimate Iraqi government, or, lacking that, the United Nations.

Even if one accepts this understanding of U.S. obligations, isn’t there a time when our obligations expire? Last October, a House resolution concluded that, “after more than four years of valiant efforts by members of the Armed Forces and United States civilians, the Government of Iraq must now be responsible for Iraq’s future course.” Such a short timetable seems less the product of a sober assessment of what it takes to succeed in the daunting nation-building project the United States has undertaken, and more a reflection of the lack of patience and long-term commitment to deal with the aftermath of interventions that is often evident in U.S. foreign policy. Had there been a realistic plan in Iraq, would it be reasonable to expect a stable, united Iraq with an agreed constitution, a revived economy and a respected and effective government that could survive on its own—all that in five years? The fact that Iraq is a mostly failed state wracked by violence is not an argument for withdrawal, but evidence of just how far the United States is from meeting its moral responsibilities.

After almost five years of multiple U.S. missteps, misdeeds and miscalculations, serious doubts arise about whether the United States has the capacity, the competence, the moral credibility or the confidence of the Iraqi people needed to do a better job. The United States has seriously failed Iraq; but past failure need not beget future failure, nor does it absolve us of our obligations. Given what is at stake, the Bush administration (and its successor) must do more to put Iraqi interests first, to commit the necessary resources (especially for protection of Iraqi civilians and for reconstruction), to engage Iraq’s neighbors and the international community, and to pursue new approaches that offer a better chance of meeting U.S. obligations. Those calling for an “end to the war” also have a heavy burden. They must show that, despite the U.S. obligations and the risks associated with failing to fulfill them, there is nothing more that can be done.

Morality Turns
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